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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT 
CORPORATION, a corpor-
ation, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v s
« 
CLEON D. TUCKER and MRS. 
CLEON D. TUCKER, also 
known as BETTY J. TUCKER, 
his wife; WILLARD M. TUCKER 
and MRS. WILLARD M. TUCKER, 
also known as PHYLLIS 0. 
TUCKER, his wife; CONTIN-
ENTAL ACCOUNT SERVICING 
HOUSE, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation; and KEY ACCOUNT 
COLLECTION HOUSE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
EUGENE S. SIMPSON and MRS. 
EUGENE S. SIMPSON, also known 
as JANE DOE SIMPSON, his ) 
wife, 
. ,
 ) 
Defendants and 
Appellants. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a promissory note bearing the 
names of the Defendants-Appellants and others. 
No. 14231 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed its complaint based upon a promis-
sory note bearing the names of the Defendants-Appellants and 
others. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to all 
defendants was granted as to the individual defendants but 
denied as to the corporate defendants whose cases are still 
before the trial court. Defendants-Appellants have appealed 
the lower court's order of summary judgment against them. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judg-
ment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-Appellants Simpson (hereinafter referred 
to as "Defendants Simpson") and others executed a promissory 
note to Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
"Plaintiff"), on March 26, 1974, in the amount of $150,000.00, 
the proceeds therefrom being received by the Defendants Simpson 
for their own benefit. The promissory note was executed for the 
purpose of facilitating a sale of certain stock and other interests 
in Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., and Key Account 
Collection House, Inc., both party defendants in this action but 
not participating in this appeal. The seller in this transaction 
was Eugene S. Simpson and the buyers were Mr. and Mrs. Cleon D. 
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Tucker and Mr. and Mrs. Willard M. Tucker, all named defendants. 
As partial security for the promissory note, the 
Defendants Tucker were required to and did place into Contin-
ental Account Servicing House, Inc., certain real properties 
valued in excess of $1,000,000.00. As additional security, 
the Defendants Simpson were required to and did place into 
escrow certain stock of the Defendant corporations. However, 
on or about June 17, 1974, the Defendants Tucker removed the 
real properties from the said corporation, allegedly because 
they believed themselves to have been defrauded by the Defen-
dants Simpson. 
As a result of the transfer of that real property 
out of the corporation, the terms of both the promissory note 
and the contract of sale were breached, and Plaintiff's security 
on the note was seriously jeopardized. Plaintiff brought this 
action for judgment on the promissory note and for a decree 
that the stock held in escrow might be sold at public auction. 
After the pleadings were filed by all parties, Plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment. 
The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment as against the individual defendants, but, inasmuch 
as the court felt the corporate defendants had* pled certain 
defenses which established issues of material fact, judgment 
was denied as against the corporate defendants. Defendants 
Simpson have appealed the trial court's decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
• POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED 
'ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF 
AND DEFENDANTS SIMPSON. 
Defendants Simpson have claimed in their appeal 
brief that certain issues of material fact remain unresolved 
and that the matter should, therefore, be remanded to the 
trial court* Further, Defendants Simpson have listed in their 
brief those question" which they allege to be disputed issues 
of material fact, to-wit: 
1. Defendants Simpson now allege that the signature 
of Pauline Simpson was a forgery. 
"Defendant Pauline Simpson. . .filed an 
affidavit. . .that she did not execute 
the promissory note in question and 
that her purported signature was a 
forgery." Appellants' Brief, 2. 
2. Defendants Simpson have sought refuge in the 
defense of the corporate defendants that the contract was 
unconscionable as to them. "Other defendants averred. . . 
that the terms of the agreement. . .were unconscionable. . . . " 
Appellants' Brief, 2. 
3. Defendants Simpson have alleged that they are not 
liable on the promissory note because they are mere accommodation 
makers. Appellants' Brief, 3. 
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4. Defendant Eugene S. Simpson has alleged that 
after he executed the promissory note "the terms and condi-
tions of the promissory note had been changed." Appellants' 
Brief, 3. 
Each of these four issues raised by Defendants 
Simpson in their brief will be dealt with separately, in 
the order in which they were presented. 
1. There is no disputed issue of material 
fact as to the signature of the Defendant 
Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson. 
Under the statutory law of the State of Utah, there 
can be no disputed issue of material fact as to the signature 
of Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson. The Defendants Simpson failed to 
deny specifically in their amended answer that the signature 
was genuine, and the signature of Mrs. Eugene S. Simpson was, 
therefore, admitted for all purposes. The law is stated at 
§70A-3-307, U.C.A., 1953, "1. Unless specifically denied 
in the pleadings, each signature on an instrument is admitted." 
Official Comment 1 to that section of the Code explains its 
significance. 
"The purpose of the requirement of a 
specific denial in the pleadings is to 
give the plaintiff notice that he must 
meet a claim of forgery or lack of auth-
ority as to a particular signature, and 
to afford him an opportunity to investi-
gate and obtain evidence. . . . In the 
absence of such specific denial, the 
signature stands admitted, and is not 
in issue." (Emphasis added.) 
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This section of the Uniform Commercial Code deals 
specifically with commercial paper, and the promissory note 
in question is by definition "commercial paper". In the 
present case, the answer of Defendants Simpson to Plaintiff's 
amended complaint, filed by them on June 5, 1975, contains 
absolutely nothing by way of a specific denial of Mrs. Simp-
son's signature. On the contrary, 51 of their amended answer 
is just a general denial to the allegations of Plaintiff's 
amended complaint. Under the rule of law applicable in Utah, 
the signature of Mrs. Simpson stands admitted and is not in 
issue. Therefore, when the court granted summary judgment 
to the Plaintiff, there was no disputed issue of fact concern-
ing the signature since the signature stood admitted. 
This rule has been applied not only in Utah but 
in all other jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and there is uniform case authority from those juris-
dictions supporting Plaintiff's position. 
In Conran v. Yager, 211 S.E.2d 288, 16 U.C.C. 320 
(S.C., 1975), the defendant appealed from a summary judgment 
granted to the plaintiff. The court based its decision affirm-
ing the summary judgment on §3-307 of the Commercial Code. 
"The appellant's first defense, a general 
denial, while effective in an action on 
a simple contract is unavailing in an 
action on a note where the note is attached 
to the complaint," Id. 321. 
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See also Merrimack Farmers Exchange v. Elliott, 276 A.2d 258, 
9 U.C.C, 287 (N.H., 1971). 
In the present case, Defendants Simpson's sole 
defense in their amended answer was a general denial and 
this was an action on a promissory note where the note was 
attached to the complaint. In Bentz v. Mullins, 24 O.App.2d 
137, 265 N.E.2d 317, 8 U.C.C. 726 (1970), the court stated, 
"It will be observed that in pleading, 
the answer of the defendant does not 
specifically deny his signature is on 
the note in question. . . . In the 
absence of such specific denial, the 
signature stands admitted and is not 
in issue." Id. 728. 
Also, in Ferris v. Nichols, 245 S.2d 660, 8 U.C.C. 1284 (Fla., 
1971), the court held, 
"In our opinion, the answer of the defen-
dant was simply a general denial of the 
assertions of the complaint. As such 
it had the legal effect of admitting 
that the defendant did sign the note 
and eliminating from the action any 
issue as to signature. Had the defen-
dant desired to deny that he signed the 
note, he should have done so by a specific 
denial addressed to the appropriate alle-
gations in the complaint." Id. 1284-5. 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also Steelman v. Associates Discount Corporation, 7 U.C.C. 
697 (Ga*App., 1970). 
Any issue as to the alleged forgery of Mrs. Simpson's 
signature was effectively waived and the signature was admitted 
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when the Defendants Simpson filed their amended answer which 
failed to deny the signature specifically. 
2. There is no disputed issue of material 
fact as to the alleged unconscionability 
of the agreement as to the Defendants 
Simpson. 
The Defendants Simpson do not allege that the con-
tract entered into is unconscionable as against themselves, but 
rather, wish to bring themselves under the umbrella of a defense 
that can only be alleged by other defendants to the action. 
The Defendants Simpson are alleging, simply stated, that since 
the contract is unconscionable as against the other defendants, 
then they too should be relieved of any contractual obligations. 
The Defendants Simpson refer to p. 90 of the record which is 
the affidavit of Eugene S. Simpson. That affidavit states 
the alleged factual issue in question: Since the execution 
of the note, the Plaintiff had allegedly unconscionably ciltered 
the contract by "the retention of a substantial proceeds of the 
loan to the remaining defendants by agents of the Plaintiff." 
R.91 (Emphasis added.) 
There are two aspects of this purported defense 
which bear close examination. First, the "remaining defendants" 
spoken by Mr. Simpson are the only parties to this action 
allegedly affected by any unconscionable contract terms, and 
the Defendants Simpson cannot avail themselves of a defense 
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possibly available only to other parties, but not to them-
selves. Secondly, the "remaining defendants" referred to in 
the affidavit include Continental Account Servicing House, 
Inc., and Key Account Collection House, Inc. These corpor-
ations are not even parties to this appeal. The trial court 
expressly recognized that factual issues might still exist 
in relation to these two corporations and expressly denied 
summary judgment as to them. R.96-7. These corporate defen-
dants are not parties to this appeal and Defendants Simpson 
cannot avail themselves of defenses available only to the 
corporate defendants* 
In addition to assailing principles of logic, the 
appeal claim of Defendants Simpson assails principles of law. 
How can the Defendants Simpson hope to avail themselves of 
equitable defenses that can be available only to third parties 
(the other defendants) when the corporate defendants are not 
even parties to the appeal and their cases are presently con-
tinuing in the trial court. Indeed they cannot according 
to law. This principle of law is stated concisely at 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts, §528 (1963). 
"As a general rule, a defense, in order to 
be available, must be one which may be 
asserted by the party urging it in his 
own right. . . . Equities existing in 
favor of third persons against plaintiff 
cannot be availed of by defendant where 
he has received all the benefits to which 
he is entitled under the contract." 
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In the present case, the Defendants Simpson admit 
that any "unconscionability" affected only the "remaining 
defendants" and that the rights and interests of the Simpsons 
were not affected thereby. Such being the case, the defense 
of unconscionability is not available to the Defendants Simpson. 
Since the defense was not available to them, it certainly was 
not a disputed issue of material fact and certainly could not 
have prevented the court's order of summary judgment as against 
the Defendants Simpson. 
3-#. There is no disputed issue of material fact 
as to the obligation of the Defendants Simp-
son on the promissory note as accommodation 
makers. 
The Defendants Simpson have alleged as a disputed 
issue of material fact that they were mere accommodation 
makers on the promissory note and are, therefore, not liable 
as a matter of law on that note. Utah statutory law concerning 
promissory notes and accommodation makers is clear in stating 
that an accommodation maker is every bit as liable on a 
promissory note as is a party who signs the note for consider-
ation. The general principle is that an accommodation maker 
has received some sort of consideration, albeit indirect or 
intangible, or else he would not have signed the note. In 
this case Simpson received the money. To hold otherwise would 
severely disrupt the American banking system and would ignore 
volumes of legal precedence both in Utah and elsewhere. Utah 
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law on the matter has been codifi ed by the adoption, 
§3-41 5 of tl le IJni form Commercial Code ; foi n: id <: i t § 7< 
U . C . A , • ' .' ' • " . '• . . ' • • • 
•
;
' ' "(1) An accommodation par ty is one who 
signs the instrument in any capacity for 
the purpose of lending his name to another 
,
 :
 party to it. (2) When the instrument has 
-.''•. been taken for value before it is due the 
accommodation party is liable in the 
capacity in which he has signed even 
though the taker kn^ws of th^ accommodat • 
Official Comme n I: Il t :: • tl :i :i . ; • 1 - it i on 
maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument without any :i : esort 
to his principal : 
I t: ; 1 las been held in the S tate of Utah tl lat even i f 
the creditor knows that one of the other parties is an accom-
modati on maker. tl le accommodat i oi I maker il s s til I Il ] it at 1 € DJI 
the promissory note. In Assets Realization Company v. Cardon, 
, ~ _;.. ^9 7, 272 P 204 (1 928), the court stated; •' 
"There is mucl i mui-n. *. i p iaj-iitif f , s claim 
that it is entitled to a judgment against 
the defendant Cardon Company upon the 
record before us. Concededly, plaintiff 
is the owner and holder of the two notes, 
and, they have not 'been paid,. Defendant , .  •', 
Cardon Company is admittedly one of the 
makers of both the notes. Two defenses 
were interposed by the defendant Cardon 
Company to defeat plaintiff's action: 
First, that it was an accommodation 
maker The mere fact that 
McCormick and Company, Bankers, knew 
that defendant Cardon Company was an 
accommodation maker does not defeat 
• plaintiff's right to recover," Id, 206. 
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The case of Miller v. Stuart, 69 Ut. 250, 253 P. 900 
(192 7) states clearly that an accommodation maker is liable 
on the instrument. 
"The evidence plainly shows that defendant 
executed and delivered the note for the 
purpose of lending his credit to the coal 
company or Quigley and Welch, relying upon 
their promise to pay the note. Defendant, 
in his answer, averred that it was repre-
sented to him, among other things, that 
the note 'was merely an accommodation and 
convenience to said Pahvant Coal Company.1 
That is the essence of the matter, and 
the defendant testified, in effect, that 
he so understood it. In such case, the 
relation of defendant to the note was that 
of accommodation party, who is defined and 
whose liability is fixed by the negotiable 
instruments law as follows: 'An accom-
modation party is one who has signed the 
instrument as maker. . .without receiving 
value therefor, and for the purpose of 
lending his name to some other person. 
Such a person is liable on the instrument 
to a holder for value. . . . • " Id. 902 
[Citations following.] (Emphasis added.) 
The negotiable instruments law which was adopted 
in Utah has been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
and the effect of the Commercial Code is even more conclusive 
than was the negotiable instruments law. The difference is 
explained at 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, §530 (1963). 
". . .The [Uniform Commercial] Code 
eliminates troublesome questions as to 
consideration and directs itself to the 
fact that an accommodation party is 
always a surety whether or not he is 
compensated or receives consideration*11 
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There can be no doubt that the big5:-A-ur^.: f 'l * 
Defendants Simpson as accommodate on parties .<.. promissory 
note render them liable to tl le Plaintiff. 
i. ''"i.^ .^.. , ^  no dio^u^^u J.J^ .^  i. iudLuiial 
act as to the terms of the promissory 
not --. 
Apppll-mts* I''11.:-4 J "i^-'i H '5 * yy •** ror review is 
that aftLiL , A. • .<.,••. : ...•••. \ . *:.. Uial ". : .the 
terms and conditions of •;! ^  oromisscry :n te had been ;hdnoea,!i 
Appellants' Brief
 # J. xii±s I * :* - nt. CM! issue i 
fact for the simple reason that after the promissory note was 
executed, it w.m Legally i mpossibJ e to change the t- *• r' of 
t i i a t in 11 i' w i 1 liuul (*x:eci :iti i lg tl le i ie ; ; it: 1 0 te Tl ie • J <= .^  ; n : y 
clear on this point. . .: ' \ • 
In the * •! •* -*1 -^  , ror!^::,:u rote err 
- - j i :<j 1 0 4 
• -
fc
 BiJ I s and N o t e s , $71 ( 1 9 3 h ; , KL I 
instrument i s reqi • »• * ' ; 
ai xy a l t e r a t i o n or ^,: , , . .\i^iO- o . . »• . * ;Mi^;n I , \ : t l s o 
be w r i t t e n and s i g n e d . ' • . B i l l s and N o t e s , §?>^~ ^) . 
Defendant?* 
phantom i s s u e f or • ... <u * i:*.. - ron *' : io'idin<;> ; J lO i t ' . e r 
t h e P l a i n t i f f n o r + r:e Dof r n , l a n r s ^ i rw^n^ « ;i\^ r r l i e u ui. - v 
cl langed terms or c , , - P . p a r ' , 
< rolai: 1 y i i :i ] ight : of t l i e i s ^mended an:.-wci • I i ^ n t i M ., amended 
c o m p l a i n t : -• r • .; . 
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"2. Defendants. . .allege affirmatively 
that the terms of the note which is 
attached as Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's 
amended complaint speaks for itself. . . . 
"5. Defendants. . .allege affirmatively 
that the terms of the contract in the 
escrow agreement speak for themselves." 
(R.76) 
Even if one of the parties to this appeal had hoped 
to rely on changed or altered terms in the promissory note or 
the contract for sale, such reliance could not be allowed. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds specifically provides that a contract 
for the sale of securities must be in writing, and this would 
include any modifications of such contract. §70A-8-319 U.C.A. 
The Utah statutes further provide that any contract for the 
sale of contract rights or an interest in a corporation must 
also be in writing and this, too, would include any modifi-
cations of such contract. §§70A-l-206, 70A-2-201, U.C.A.' 
The Utah Legislature has also adopted a parol evi-
dence rule, found at §70A-2-202, U.C.A., which would conclu-
sively prohibit the court from considering any purported oral 
modifications or changes in the promissory note or the contract 
for sale. 
"Terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are 
otherwise set forth in a writing intended by 
the parties as a final expression of their 
agreement with respect to such terms as are 
included therein may not be contradicted by 
evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be 
explained or supplemented. . .(b) by evidence 
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. •' •••••'' of consistent additional terms unless •; '.-'•._ 
the court finds the writing to have been 
intended as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreemei i1 : " 
Ii i the present case, we are d*- .^ . - ^  i ^romisrory 
note and contract for sale which were intended a,- -< o-nplete 
a n d o x ' L " j ' u " " ,;;t cit onion i <>i I h t ^ r n r : <>l 
fore, j IL u <'\ja^r^t o± contemporaneous -. ^ubseque * ^ *! 
modif i~~*t ion ~ canno 4 bo ^i l <•! * •*-^^d b y ":*> ?oir * - w ^ *:-x 
I'liuiinK1 !> « "oiuir . I**., vwai. . ,Ae?= 
t h e pc ..':* * . *. tf, c c i r i ^••:,*j :iot iccept o* idcr.^w ,J subse-
quent uiai i 'fUfications 
MI J ultima ry judgment o™ +•• . ; 
"Uunder paragra^' : , jon isttnt addr.iL.iiu. 
terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved, 
unless the court finds that the writing was 
intended by both parties as a complete and 
exclusive statement of all of * he terms. 
If the additional terms are such that, if 
agreed upon, they would certainly have 
been included in the document in view of the 
court, then evidence of their alleged 
making must be kept from the trier of-fact," 
(Emphasis added.) 
If the subsequent modifications I" < > I In |:n nni i ISSOI y 
n o t e -in11 i ni1,, i" in i I j I'MDI.
 # I.Jion tliey won Id uuL constitute a 
material fact and would not be subject to review by this court. 
li:f on the other luind, the alloqcd subsequent oral is 
were truly substantial, then "evidence of their alLeqrd making 
must be "kept from the trier- of fact." Kit her way, any changed 
terms en condi. I ionu '< M ^ J U em I.SSOJP, nolo were not proper . • 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 16 -
matters to be considered by a jury or by the trier of fact 
and the court's order of summary judgment was proper and 
correct* 
POINT II 
THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW HEREIN 
APPLICABLE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE 
DEFENDANTS SIMPSON IS SIGNIFICANTLY 
RESTRICTED DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THE CASE. 
It is the rule in appellate proceedings that the 
proceedings before the trial court are presumed to have been 
proper and any rulings are presumed to have been properly 
made and for sound reasons. 
"The scope of appellate review is largely 
influenced by a number of rebuttable pre-
sumptions, pre-eminent among which is that 
which, at least where the decision has 
been rendered by a court of record or 
a court of general jurisdiction, assumes 
the correctness of the decision or ruling 
appealed from and the regularity of the 
proceedings below. Thus, every reasonable 
intendment favorable to a ruling of the 
court below will be indulged, and in the 
absence of an affirmative showing to the 
contrary, a ruling of the court below will 
be presumed to have been properly made 
and for sound reasons." 5 Am.Jur.2d, 
Appeal and Error, §704 (1962). ^ '~\ . : 
It is Plaintiff's contention that Defendants Simpson 
have failed to make any affirmative showing that any of the 
rulings of the trial court directed against them were improper 
or unsound. Defendants Simpson have presented to the court 
on appeal four purported factual issues. In each case, it 
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lias been shown hy PI a i r itiff that a disputed issue of material 
fa^t door* no t «E . x d s I: I i 1 * " • •" "• *' 
Simpson have even s o u g h t U\t t-enefi* ui c ^ f e n s e ^ *ro+ r : a*. 
a' ^ i 1 - - ' ;-• * •••tv< r p > * * ^- ^ i!< ^i-^ o rtot ' ^ r f .a in ] y not ava i 1-
a.
 fcV. t > v , . >JHL i ., /L 'v §528 , sup i a « ^ 
The -ccpt . c i appe l l . i t r - r e ; ev r e s t r i c t e d by 
the L>cf>> If 1 ias f u l l y -•• 
answered <\^  i s s u e s p r ^ e n t t>. . x ^ \r , " l i n t s and t h e 
^ i a i n t i t ; , i; t r. n.iT_; •< *. * f-< ai: o4 \* * i s s u e s b e f o r e the 
. ss j 1:>] e tc 
new XSL;U^\3 t :c presented ; r i s , ppoa. issues to \ rtiich 
^ h i ^ f 1 ^ TM i] re 1 * -^  -i. + ^ oppc •*-.i *»* * -"espond. Th i s 
. ;.... . . .rl^ ii: i Me ad v. Mead, 
,2u 001 (Okla. 1956). 
''; i. . :•: .-.either the duty nor til le pre-
rogative of the* Supreme Court to explore 
a theory which is not raised in Appel-
lant's brief, to find a valid ground 
on which to reverse the trial court's 
judgment.n =.-
'. ^ rv-. *. - \ 
\. so-, CONCLUSION 
• •' - -- The Defendants Si mpson have stated in their bra ef 
1 Das .e tl ied r • :::oi: it en tioi I 1:1 ic : I I In,-
•*:u?- jreier of *L.I. m i r y s u d g m e n t s h o u ] d be reversed. Each 
of those grounds has H-M: .-lealt with, one -by -one: Tl le matter 
c 'f Mrs , Simpson s • signals.. has been wa iv ed by Defendants ' 
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failure to plead it specifically in their amended answer; 
any alleged unconscionability of the agreement as to other 
defendants cannot be a defense for the Defendants Simpson; 
an accommodation maker is clearly liable under law to the 
same extent as any other maker on a promissory note; and 
the written, integrated terms of the promissory note and 
contract for sale must stand alone, both under law and as 
admitted in the amended answer of the Defendants Simpson. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Richard J. Leedy, Attorney 
Utah 84102, for Appellant, 744 East Broadway, Salt Lake City,  
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